

VZCZCXRO0858  
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHVC  
DE RUEHGP #2084/01 3240937  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 200937Z NOV 07  
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4449  
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE  
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE  
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2036  
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4138  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5757  
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1377

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 002084

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

FROM CDA FOR PM A-A/S STEPHEN MULL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [ECON](#) [ETRD](#) [ETTC](#) [BM](#) [SN](#)  
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PM A-A/S MULL'S VISIT TO SINGAPORE

REF: SINGAPORE 1991

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Shields, reasons 1.4 (a)(b)&(d)

11. (C) Embassy Singapore looks forward to your December 3 visit. Your meetings with senior Singapore government officials offer an excellent opportunity to:

- express thanks for GOS support in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- highlight our close security relationship and the importance of interoperability with our armed forces;
- encourage the GOS to continue its counterproliferation efforts and to support enhanced law enforcement cooperation; and
- discuss regional developments following the ASEAN, East Asia and related summits.

Partners, not Allies  
-----

12. (SBU) Our excellent bilateral relationship with Singapore is founded on a convergence of views on key strategic issues and substantial trade and investment ties. As a tiny, wealthy, predominantly ethnic-Chinese state surrounded by much larger, poorer, Malay/Muslim neighbors, Singapore is motivated by an acute sense of vulnerability. It is also grappling with the economic and strategic impact of the rise of China and India. Consequently, Singapore views a strong U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military presence in the region as essential to its own and the region's peace and prosperity.

13. (C) Singapore is a valuable logistics hub for U.S. Forces. Our 2005 bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) updated and further enhanced what had already been very strong cooperation military and strategic cooperation. However, the SFA stops short of a formal alliance in deference to Singapore's concerns about regional sensitivities. Our military leases its facilities here; there are "places, not bases" on the island. Singapore routinely buys the best equipment available for its small, highly trained military. The GOS seeks greater interoperability with the U.S. military and shows a strong preference for U.S. equipment. The level of technology release is an important factor in its procurement decisions.

Iraq and Afghanistan  
-----

14. (C) Singapore continues to provide support for Coalition forces in Iraq, and GOS leaders have publicly stressed that

failure in Iraq would have dire consequences for the region and beyond. Singapore's leaders are concerned about the "Arabization" of Southeast Asian Islam and the potential spread of Middle East-inspired radicalism here. In Afghanistan, Singapore provided modest support for Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) activities this year and has indicated (reftel) it will expand these efforts next year. It continues to rotate deployments of KC-135 tankers, C-130 cargo airplanes, and LSTs to support CENTCOM operations. The GOS has not been willing, however, to deploy ground forces. The Singapore Armed Forces is a professional-conscript mix, with all Singaporean males over 18 required to fulfill two years of national service and subject to reserve responsibilities until age 40.

#### Terrorism and Non-proliferation

-----

15. (SBU) Singapore is a reliable and highly capable partner in the Global War on Terrorism. In 2001, the GOS uncovered a plot by Jemaah Islamiya to bomb targets in Singapore, including U.S. diplomatic and military facilities. Singapore continues to view itself as a potential "trophy" terrorist target and has implemented a range of measures to enhance its security. It has also improved counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and other countries and is working with Malaysia and Indonesia to enhance maritime security in the Strait of Malacca. The GOS currently holds approximately 34 terrorism suspects in detention.

16. (C) Singapore participates actively in a number of counterproliferation initiatives, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative,

SINGAPORE 00002084 002 OF 002

Megaports, and is currently working with us to establish a Secure Freight Initiative pilot. A major transshipment hub, Singapore has announced plans to bring its strategic goods list into compliance with the four major international export control regimes by January 2008, although we remain concerned about an exception to the expanded Strategic Goods Control Act that relates to goods remaining in Singapore's free trade zones for less than designated periods of time. It has taken action against a number of suspect shipments, but remains focused on maintaining the competitiveness of its port and worries about financial liability for seizures. Singapore is an eager consumer of our EXBS training. Singapore still does not collect manifest data on transshipment or transit cargo unless it is bound for the United States, e.g., under CSI. Information sharing between our respective law enforcement organizations is improving, but is sometimes impeded by Singapore's stringent bank secrecy laws, for example. The GOS has made several legislative and regulatory changes related to countering the financing of terrorism, as well as anti-money laundering. Singapore has been extremely cooperative in the area of UNSCR terrorist finance designations. As an IAEA board member, Singapore has supported our efforts to press Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

#### Regional Issues

-----

17. (C) As a small state, Singapore routinely encourages outside powers to take an interest in Southeast Asia and compete, in a healthy way, for influence. This minimizes the ability of any one state to dominate the region and gives greater relevance to the interests of Southeast Asia. For example, Singapore lobbied successfully for India's inclusion in the East Asia Summit. The GOS frequently urges us to engage more with Indonesia and welcomes our resumption of military ties there. Singapore also sees strengthening ASEAN as a useful response to the region's strategic and economic challenges and is using its current chairmanship of the organization to encourage political and economic integration.

Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:  
<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/index.cfm>  
HERBOLD